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as we go and try to solve it with as little confusion and dis
location of our work as is possible. It will require perseverance
and will test our fortitude and challenge our ingenuity.
We have reviewed briefly some of the effects of the war on
our procedure and our program. Our organization will rise to
every occasion and meet every responsibility.
PLANNING FOR THE POST-WAR PERIOD
Walter H. Blucher,
Executive Director, American Society of Planning Officials,
Chicago, Illinois
Sixty days ago while we in the United States of North
America were giving half-hearted attention to the defense of
our country, many of us were thinking of the post-defense
period—of what we were going to do if somebody else won
the war for us.
Today, when most of us are giving almost whole-hearted
attention to the winning of the war, talk of the post-war
period doesn’t seem very realistic. I say “almost whole-hearted
support” because I believe that most of us as yet have no
realization of the size of the task before us, the effort re
quired, or the sacrifices necessary to win the war.
Our first task is to win the war. To that end we must direct
all our energies. If we are to plan for a post-war United States
of America, we must be sure that we, not somebody else, are
in a position to make and carry out those plans.
I think we can and will win this war. It may take a little
longer than it would if all of us took it more seriously, but when
the showdown comes we will get together and forget all indi
vidual profit motives.
And so we don’t want to win the war only to lose the things
we fought for.
It isn’t wholly unrealistic to think now of the post-war
period, to think of the things we are fighting to preserve. And
although we might want to relegate post-war planning into a
little corner in the back of our heads, realism tells us that
we cannot separate war planning from after-we-have-won-thewar planning. They merge together, and I hope to demonstrate
shortly why they are inseparable.
There are at least three aspects of post-war planning. First,
there must be some planning for the peace that is to follow
the termination of the war. I doubt very much if we are in
any position to say what the terms of that peace shall be. If
the war ended tomorrow, we wouldn’t know what to do with
Messrs. Hitler, Himmler, and Hirohito. We don’t have to
bother about Mussolini. We wouldn’t know whether they ought
to be shot, interned, or turned over to the Poles for a just
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retribution. I have no doubt that the Germans, however, know
very definitely what they would do with Messrs. Churchill
and De Gaulle if they won the war.
Then there must be planning for the post-war economic
development of all the nations of the world. If the war were
to end tomorrow, we would have no plans showing how the
resources of the various nations could be used in order to
provide a suitable standard of living. On the other hand, I
have no doubt that if the Axis won the war, Germany would
have definite plans for the economic development of what coun
tries remained; and these plans would provide for a standard
of living which we might not consider suitable, but which they
would consider suitable for an inferior race.
Third, there is the planning necessary for our own country
when the war is won: planning which will prevent a depres
sion, planning which will permit the full utilization of our
extensive resources, planning which will give us a standard
of living higher than anything we have had before, and plan
ning for the kind of nation, for states and cities, and for a
mode of living that we have fought to preserve.
And at this point let me define resources. The resources of
this nation are not buried in a hole in the ground at Fort Knox,
Kentucky. The Germans taught us that. The resources of
this nation consist of our land, our water, our power, our
minerals, our forests, our machines, our muscles, our minds,
and our skills; and with those resources we can create a stand
ard of living higher than has ever been known, and we can
use our resources so as not to despoil them, but so as to leave
something for our children and for our children's children.
War

and

Post-War Planning Are Inseparable

Before going further, I must prove that war planning and
post-war planning are inseparable. I think it must be obvious
to all that the construction of a cantonment which will house
25,000 soldiers adjacent to a community of 1,500 creates not
only present problems but a post-war problem. The building
of the powder plant at Charlestown employing 10,000 people
in a community which previously had a population of 900 has
created not only present problems but very marked future
problems. When San Diego's population increased almost
over night by 30,000, San Diego was left with a post-war
planning problem. Let us, however, take one example and
examine it specifically—the new Ford bomber plant just out
side Ypsilanti, Michigan.
Here is a plan that will employ, it is anticipated, 60,000
persons. It is about 20 miles from the present Ford Motor
Company plant. Ypsilanti is a small community that has
neither the labor reservoir nor the housing accommodations
for so large a plant. It is probable that many of the present
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employees of the Ford Motor Company in Dearborn at the
River Rouge plant will be employed in the new bomber plant.
Many of these employees now live in the City of Detroit. An
origin-and-destination survey of people driving to the Ford
Motor Company plant in River Rouge from the City of Detroit
shows workers scattered over the entire city. They already
have a long drive to the present Ford Motor plant. Will they
drive an additional 20 miles over highways that today are
already congested ?
It would appear that very little consideration had been given
to the matter of ingress and egress to the plant when it was
placed in its present location. As a result, the Michigan State
Highway Department has been called upon to prepare an
emergency plan for ingress and egress to the bomber plant.
These highways are complicated in design, require three-level
crossings, and will cost, it is estimated, 4 1/2 million dollars.
But the principal questions are, Where are the workers going
to be housed and how can they reach the new plant? Ypsilanti
Township and Washtenaw County have very wisely, in my
opinion, decided not to permit any shack development in their
areas. They have already noted the disadvantages of un
controlled growth in several townships north of the City of
Detroit. Will the workers at the plant owning homes in the
City of Detroit give them up in order that they may build
new, permanent homes in the area adjacent to the bomber
plant? Assuming that they are willing to do so, and that
they can sell their present homes, both of which are question
able, can they get the materials with which to construct new
homes ?
It is exceedingly doubtful if housing facilities can be pro
vided adjacent to the bomber plant, at least in the early stages
of its operation. It is probable, therefore, that the workers
will be forced to drive a considerable distance and that this
will be the principal solution to the problem, Thus, we have a
present defense problem of transporting workers from their
homes to their work. I understand that the Ford Motor
Company proposes to create a parking lot that will take care
of half of the employees of the bomber plant. Existing streets
leading from the City of Detroit are wholly inadequate at the
present time. Are they to be widened ? Are new streets to be
constructed? Are the workers to use their own automobiles?
This doesn't seem likely in view of their inability to purchase
automobile tires. Are they to be moved by mass transportation
facilities? Must new transportation facilities be developed?
But that is only part of the picture. The other part of the
picture is, What are we going to do with the Ford bomber plant
when the war is over? It is my guess that this building will
become a permanent structure in the Ford industrial plant.
If my guess is correct, it means that we must not only make
temporary, but permanent arrangements (a) for the trans
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portation of workers from the City of Detroit, and (b) for the
housing of some workers adjacent to the plant.
Certain CIO unions have asked that a community with homes
for 10,000 workers be constructed in the Ypsilanti area. I
wonder if they realize the implication of such a program. A
community of 10,000 working families would probably mean a
community of 20,000 families, when you include those in
service industries, in shops, stores, garages, gasoline stations,
etc. In order to be conservative, let us assume a community
of 15,000 families. This represents a city of 60 to 75 thousand
persons. A city of that size demanding minimum public facili
ties in the way of sewers, water, schools, fire protection, police
protection, parks and recreation, libraries, etc., will find that
it costs money to maintain a community of that size. Even if
the bulk of the facilities should be constructed originally
through federal grants, it still costs money to maintain a com
munity of that size. If the community has no industries to
share the tax burden, the citizens will soon learn that either
their taxes will be higher than they can bear or they will have
to do without essential public services. A recent survey of
Boston shows that 80.5% of the population fails to pay enough
taxes to cover the cost of services rendered. It might be far
better to expand a community that already has certain basic
facilities. It might even be better to provide for the movement
of a considerable part of the working population from present
homes in the City of Detroit. We know, of course, that distance
is not the controlling factor; time is the important factor. It
happens that I live 25 miles from the City of Chicago, and when
I make that statement to friends they say, “Oh, you are a
commuter. I suppose it takes you some time to get into the
city.” I then give them my definition of a commuter. He is
a person who can travel 25 miles in less time than it takes a
city man to travel 5 miles. The travel time from my suburban
community to my office is approximately 35 minutes. There
is one train that does that trip in the evening in 20 minutes.
In planning for our country, when the war is won, there are
several tests which might be applied. What can we afford or
what do we need? I choose to use the second test, What do
we need?, because in my opinion we can afford, within reason,
anything that we need. Ours is not a nation that suffers from
a shortage of resources, and we mustn’t permit ourselves to be
regulated by the fiction of finance.
Funds

for

Post-War Construction

When the war is over, there will be some people of influence
and in high places who will say that there must be immediate
extensive retrenchment, that we must cut taxes to the bone,
that we must cut out all public expenditures. There isn’t any
thing we can do when the war is over that will be so damaging
as a policy and program of that kind. Actually, we can’t afford
to cut expenditures radically when the war is over.
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Two months ago we were talking about an annual expendi
ture for war purposes of 30 billion dollars. Today we are
planning to spend over 50 billion dollars for war purposes in
the next year. We will probably have a national income of 110
billion dollars. Does anybody believe that we can immediately
drop our national income to 60 billion dollars and avoid the
worst depression we will have known ? The answer seems clear.
Publicly or privately we must continue to build things and to
spend money in order that our national income may remain at
about 100 billion. I for one would be glad to see private pro
grams that would not necessitate any federal expenditures.
If private industry can take up the slack, well and good.
Private industry will create and manufacture consumer goods,
and we haven’t had too many of them heretofore. It is my
hunch, however, that private industry will not be able to take
up the slack immediately and that public expenditures on a
very large scale will be required to cushion the shock to carry
us through the readjustment period.
I said public expenditures on a very large scale. I don’t
mean one billion dollars or five billion dollars a year. I mean
enough billions of dollars above the income created by private
enterprise to maintain our national income at a level of about
100 billion dollars.
Suppose we were to have 25 billion dollars available for
public works. What would we do with them? If we had no
plans, we would probably use the money to build a few roads
here and there, mostly disconnected, mostly not serving the
areas where they were really required. We will build a sewer
here, a water main there, a new school perhaps where it isn’t
needed because of declining population, a new park and play
ground, a small housing project; we will pave a few alleys and
we won’t be able to find enough important jobs to keep all of
our men at work, so we will invent a number of unimportant
jobs. That’s what we are going to do if we do not have any
plans.
We don’t have to permit ourselves to get in that condition.
We have enough time to prepare plans on a grand scale. One
of my criticisms of the present public work reserve is that it
is built on too picayune a base, that its sights are too low and
that the scale is far too small.
I’ll tell you what I think we ought to do when the war is over.
We ought to rebuild our cities so that they are fit places for
human beings to live in. We ought to eliminate all slums and
blighted areas and give to every person who is willing and able
to work a decent house to live in, work to do, assurance of
security, adequate recreation facilities. And when I say we
ought to rebuild our cities, I do not mean that we must merely
cut a new street through here or build a new park through
there. I mean completely rebuild our cities, wipe out the
blighted areas, build housing projects on a scale which we can’t
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at the moment imagine, put parks and playgrounds adjacent
to these housing projects so that people have better living
facilities in the central areas adjacent to their places of work
than they now have in their suburbs to which they have run
for escape. The rebuilding of our cities will require new streets
and schools and filtration plants and sewage disposal plants.
But each one of these items can't be isolated. It will be part
of a big, comprehensive scheme and pattern for living. We will
build super-highways, but they won't be isolated projects
developed for the purpose of getting people from outside the
city into the center. These super-highways will be designed
as parts of a program that will help to complete our pattern
of the community.
One of the shortcomings of most of our super-highway pro
grams has been that they were isolated projects imposed upon
the existing pattern of the community, considered apart from
and not as a part of a general transportation program, con
sidered apart from and not as a part of a program for the
rebuilding of the community. That kind of super-highway
can actually create further damage for an area already
blighted. We want only the kind of super-highway that will
contribute something to community redevelopment.
And in passing, let me say that I have seen some pretty good
schemes for the construction of super-highways that will
bring people from the outskirts to the center of the city—
thousands of people. But I have not seen a single scheme that
has given consideration to the matter of parking or storing
those thousands of vehicles when they get to the center of
the city.
Rebuilding Transportation Systems

When we rebuild our cities, we are going to rebuild our
transportation systems; we are going to get rid of our obsolete
types of street cars, our old wooden coaches on elevateds.
And when we rebuild our cities, we are going to look at the
whole transportation problem because we cannot separate
streets from super-highways, subways, elevateds, and from
street cars—they are all designed with the purpose of carry
ing people, and it is people we are interested in. Counting the
number of vehicles on the street tells us how many vehicles
are using that street, but it provides no real solution to the
problem of conveying people from their places of work to
their places of residence. People, homes, factories, stores,
parks, theatres, auditoriums determine the traffic pattern of
a community.
We are going to rebuild our transportation system; we are
going to make our highways adequate for the 33 million auto
mobiles now owned in the United States. And although we are
going to rebuild and extend our rural highways, it is my opinion
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that we are going to give far greater consideration to our high
ways within metropolitan areas than we have previously given,
because that is where the people and the automobiles are.
And we are going to rebuild our railroads. As I stated earlier,
I am a suburbanite, and I live 25 miles from the center of the
City of Chicago. We have excellent suburban electric service,
among the best in the United States. On that same roadbed,
however, running through a number of communities, oldfashioned, smoking steam locomotives pound and roar. We
don't notice the electric trains, but I have a neighbor whose
house rattles, where he has some glass brick, every time a
freight train goes by. The worst sections of most of our cities
are along the railroads, and there is no reason for that. We
have and will have enough electric power, and we can construct
enough Diesel engines, to eliminate most of the unsatisfactory
aspects of our present, outmoded transportation system. We
might even arrange to get our freight cars off friction axles
and onto roller bearings. I have a friend who, a few years ago
before the development of the streamliner, used to say of the
railroads that the only improvement that had been made in 20
years in railroad cars was the installation of a slot for used
razor blades.
I have been talking about our cities, but all the replanning
and all the rebuilding won't take place there. I have seen rural
slums as bad as the worst I have ever seen in the cities. They
must be eliminated. The farmer who works as hard as he
can is also entitled to a decent home, recreation, and security.
Our cut-over lands will be reforested and used in the future on
a sustained-yield basis. Our recreational facilities will be ex
panded so that every family can employ its leisure time in a
pleasurable manner. Lands that shouldn't be farmed will be
retired from farming because we have enough good land ade
quately to sustain the nation.
Heretofore we have abused our resources, we have wasted
our heritage; but there is enough left to serve as fit foundation
for a high, and continuing high, standard of living.
Times change and people change with them. A few years
ago most of the industrialists of the United States would have
said that I am an idealist, crack-brained, theoretical, and crazy.
They would have said of me, “He has never met a payroll and
therefore doesn't know what he is talking about." I suppose
many industrialists would say the same thing of me today.
But times change and men change with the times. I was
amazed the other day when I received a publication from the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and found it the
most enlightened piece of literature that has come across my
desk from that organization. It was a paper given by David C.
Prince, President of the American Institute of Electrical Engi
neers and Vice-President of the General Electric Company. It
was devoted to post-defense readjustments and the part that
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private industry might play in such readjustments. In this
paper Mr. Prince said:
... it is becoming more and more apparent that by some time
in 1943 we will be turning out national output of the order of 110
billions, measured by 1940 dollars.
When we have proved that we can do that, and that we can keep
55 million people busy working about 46 hours a week to do it, there
is certainly no justification for us as a nation to be content with the
40 billions of dollars of national output which we had at the bottom
of the last depression.
And having proved that we can do it for war purposes, there is
no reason why we cannot also do it for peace purposes.

And then he went on to say:
. . . together these two, a private and a public works reserve,
will require, it is estimated, using 1946 as a typical post-war year,
approximately 23 billions a year of total construction, including plant
equipment.
The reason, as I see it, why the pump-priming of the 30’s didn’t
work was that what was attempted was to do a 25-billion-dollar job
with 4 and 5 billions. If you have a pump to prime and you pour
water in at a lesser rate than it can leak out through the foot valves,
it just never primes, and that is essentially what the condition was
that we had during the depression. We didn’t realize this because
nobody actually got to work, got down to cases, applied a measuring
stick to tell just what the magnitude of the problem was.

Not long ago I received a communication from an Indiana
statesman which said in part:
Tremendously important problems confront our State today and
even more important problems will face us in the future. . . .
All of us realize that the Defense Period with its changes in
industry and agriculture presents problems now. We also realize that
the post-war period will offer even more serious problems. The em
ployment of men returning from military service, the softening of
the economic shock that always has followed a boom period, the
wisest use of our agricultural resources and use of newly established
industrial plants, maintaining a satisfactory water supply, how to
plan for our transportation of the future, are only a few of the
obvious problems to which we need to direct our thought and action.
Solution of these problems is vital to the welfare and progress of
our State.

That understanding statement was made by your Governor,
Henry F. Schricker, after he had appointed a State Planning
Board.
Planning Must Be Organized

and

Financed

Let me say, however, that you cannot expect to do a proper
planning job on the state, county, or local level unless you
have an organization equipped and financed to do planning.
Plans cannot be drawn out of thin air. They can be prepared
only after careful study and by a staff trained to do planning.
My confidential agents tell me that the organization for county
highway planning and development in Indiana leaves much to
be desired. There are good men and much good work has
been done, but that has been in spite of inadequate organiza
tion. The people of Indiana, as I understand it, have not given
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to highway officials all the administrative and financial support
needed to do a really good job. Nor have the people of Indiana
given to your State Planning Board the finances necessary to
demonstrate how effective planning can be. Contrast your
$2,500 appropriation with the annual appropriation of $50,000
for state planning in other enlightened states.
Let me repeat: you won't get your planning done unless you
are willing to pay for it. If, when the war is over and won,
you are going to be satisfied with small, piecemeal, unrelated
projects, which will on the whole be unsatisfactory and which
will fail to take advantage of the opportunities then existing,
you can go along without the advantages of planning. But if
you want to do a real rebuilding job in the state in its rural and
urban areas, you can't waste any more time in getting plans
ready.
Today I was reading the proceedings of the regional con
ference on the Public Work Reserve and came across the follow
ing statement made by a representative of the Department of
Public Instruction of the State of Michigan:
Some time ago, the State Director called on the Superintendent
of Public Instruction and they together planned a meeting for the
Public Work Reserve in connection with some members of our De
partment and we worked out an agreement whereby we would go into
this matter on the basis of comprehensive planning, which we thought
meant we would take a lot of time. Now here is our problem, as I
see it anyway. Michigan probably has about 500 natural community
areas that would be able to support some kind of decent school sys
tem, but instead of having these 400 or 500 school districts, we have
about 6,300 districts. In the planning there has been a haste about
getting these prospectuses filed in Washington and on top of that
we have now had communication from the Department of Education
in Washington asking us again to hurry information as to the school
building needs in Michigan. Well, you know what happened. We
sent out all these forms and each district imagined they needed a
building costing from $100,000 to $1,000,000. The first one that came
in was for a district in a declining community. They have indicated
a need for a school building for $800,000. The assessed valuation of
that district is $400,000. Are we to go along on the basis of taking
time and planning comprehensively or are we to immediately fill
out the School Building Report for the entire State?

You have your choice—either you can plan a sound program
or go without planning and have chaos.
Over in England they are giving very serious consideration
to post-war planning for what they hope will be a changed
world. The city engineer of Coventry recently started a talk
by saying:
Sweet are the uses of adversity. For years we have been trying
to rebuild the center of Coventry and were always met with the claim
that we couldn’t afford it, that the land and buildings were too dear,
and now we have only the land—there are no buildings. May we
have the wisdom to replan Coventry as it should be.

And another Britisher, F. J. Osborne, in a little pamphlet
entitled Overture to Planning said:
I have no doubt at all that town-planning could have been made
a popular movement after the last war had not town-planners them
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selves despaired of their own evangel and accepted the good layout
of badly-placed housing estates as a substitute. The absence, until
almost the end of that war, of any serious discussion of reconstruc
tion problems may have been a contributory factor. At any rate, it
is on record that what ought to have been a town-building move
ment—it was the greatest opportunity that ever occurred in our
history, not excepting the coming one—became a housing movement. I
was one of the lone voices who said so at the time. It is useless now
to cry over spilt suburbs. But it is salutary to remember that great
opportunities can be lost by small thinking.

Times change and men change with them. Sometimes times
change and men stand still, and because of that we are inclined
to forget the important things they did when they were in
tune with the times or ahead of them. On March 12, 1927, the
President of the United States, in urging the completion of the
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Deep Waterway, said:
There is nothing that so lifts the spirit, the ideals and the faith
of af people as confidence in their ability at great undertakings and
the proof of this ability through fine achievement.

That was Herbert Hoover in 1927.
We have all the resources, the land, the water, the power,
the minerals, the forests, the crops, the muscles, the skills, and
the brains to make this a great nation; all we need is to use
these resources; all we need is boldness, vision, imagination
and courage.
THE EFFECT OF PRIORITIES ON HIGHWAY
IMPROVEMENT
C. M. Hathaway,
Engineer of Construction, Illinois State Highway Department,
Springfield, Illinois
The OPM became a real necessity during 1941. Its origin
was very simple: when the demand for certain materials far
exceeded the supply and the requirements for defense projects
had become critical, then some form of allocation, or priority,
had to be given to protect them. The best illustration is the
priority on steel. We were told in August that total defense
projects, that is, the manufacture of planes, tanks, and other
war materials, including the construction of army camps and
war industry plants, needed about 45 per cent of the total 1941
steel production. Furthermore, it was very apparent that
orders for civilian steel, as it is called, were greatly in excess
of the remaining 55 per cent; something had to be done about
it. Another more serious situation was the fact that, of the
so-called civilian requirements, there were widely varying
degrees of necessity. Even the Steel Division of the OPM
did not have the situation in hand; it didn't know what jobber
might be hoarding steel for the future; it knew that there
might be large shipments of steel for very unimportant proj
ects, and also that certain important near-defense projects

